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Abstract—Secret key generation (SKG) from shared random-
ness at two remote locations has been shown to be vulnerable
to denial of service attacks in the form of jamming. Typically,
such attacks are alleviated with frequency hopping/spreading
techniques that rely on expansion of the system bandwidth. In
the present study, energy harvesting (EH) is exploited as a novel
counter-jamming approach that alleviates the need for extra
bandwidth resources. Assuming the legitimate users have EH
capabilities, the idea is that part of the jamming signal can
potentially be harvested and converted into useful communication
power. In this framework, the competitive interaction between a
pair of legitimate users and a jammer is formulated as a zero-
sum game. A critical transmission power for the legitimate users
is identified which allows to completely characterize the unique
NE of the game in closed form. Remarkably, this threshold
also provides the option to effectively neutralize the jammer,
i.e., prevent the jammer from carrying out the attack altogether.
Through numerical evaluations, EH is shown to be a counter-
jamming approach that can offer substantial gains in terms of
relative SKG rates.
Index Terms—Energy harvesting, secret key generation, jam-
ming attacks, zero-sum games, Nash equilibrium
I. INTRODUCTION
Secret key generation (SKG) from shared randomness at
two remote locations has been extensively studied for more
than three decades [1]–[4] and is currently being considered
for applications such as the internet of things (IoT) [5]. In
this direction, practical designs combining SKG with standard
message authentication codes for integrity have been shown
to be resilient to spoofing, tampering and man-in-the-middle
(MiM) active attacks [6]. Nevertheless, SKG techniques are
not fully robust against active adversaries. Denial of service
attacks in the form of jamming are a known vulnerability of
SKG systems; in [7] it was demonstrated that with increasing
jamming power, the rate of the generated keys decreases
sharply and the SKG process can in essence be brought to
a halt.
Typically, counter-jamming measures rely on the availability
of spectral resources and employ frequency hopping/spreading
strategies [8], [9]. However, next generation terminals are
likely to be enhanced with many new features that could
prove pivotal in protecting against jamming. For example,
greater energy autonomy exploiting energy harvesting (EH)
approaches [10], [11] is being researched for systems such
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as wireless sensors and RFID devices for IoT applications.
Given the interest in employing SKG in IoT, it is sensible to
investigate whether EH could be utilized in such systems as
a counter-jamming approach by using the jamming power to
enhance the quality of the legitimate transmissions.
Motivated by the above, in the present work we investigate
SKG systems under jamming attacks in which the legitimate
nodes are equipped wih EH capabilities. We focus on time
switching EH protocols [11] in which for a portion of time the
legitimate nodes operate in EH mode and switch to the SKG
procedure for the rest. A zero-sum game theoretic framework
is employed to study the adversarial interaction between the
legitimate nodes and the jammer and the game’s unique Nash
equilibrium (NE) is characterized in closed form. Our analysis
reveals the existence of a critical power threshold pth and of
an associated optimal harvesting duration for the legitimate
users; when the legitimate nodes employ EH for longer than
this duration, the attacker’s optimal strategy is not to jam at
all, hence, it is effectively neutralized. However, this proves
a suboptimal strategy; interestingly, at the NE it is found
that both parties transmit at full power. Our numerical results
demonstrate that the gains in employing EH as a counter-
jamming technique are substantial in terms of relative SKG
rates. To the best of our knowledge, this work is the first to
consider EH as a counter-jamming technique.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II the SKG
model is introduced while in Section III the adversarial in-
teraction between the EH legitimate nodes and the jammer
is formulated as a zero-sum game. In III-A, the necessary
conditions for neutralizing the jammer are investigated while
the complete characterization of the unique NE is presented in
III-B. Numerical illustrations and a detailed discussion of the
possible counter-jamming strategies are presented in Section
IV. Finally, we conclude in Section V.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
In the present work we propose a novel approach for
alleviating the impact of jamming in SKG systems assuming
that the legitimate nodes are equipped with EH capabilities and
examine whether this added functionality is useful in preempt-
ing jamming attacks. The main motivation behind this study
is two-fold. First, the scarcity of the spectral resources renders
the investigation of counter-jamming approaches that do not
require an increase of the necessary bandwidth very attractive.
Secondly, it is interesting to investigate under what conditions
harvesting the jamming power could act as a counter-incentive
to jamming itself, i.e., characterize the operating region in
which the adversary does not benefit from the attack anymore.
In this Section, we build the system model in a progressive and
intuitive manner. First, we briefly review SKG related basics
in II-A. Subsequently, in II-B the baseline system model is
extended to incorporate jamming attacks and finally in II-C
the complete system model is presented assuming that the
legitimate users exploit EH to counteract the jammer’s attacks.
A. Background on SKG Processes
Typically, the SKG process consists of three phases. In
the first phase, known as shared randomness distillation, the
legitimate nodes – referred to as Alice and Bob – observe
dependent random variables denoted by YA, YB while an
eavesdropper, referred to as Eve observes YE . In multi-path
wireless channels, a readily available source of shared random-
ness is provided by the fading channel coefficients [3], [4],
[12]. In this work, we focus precisely on shared randomness
extraction from Rayleigh fading coefficients.
In the next two phases, known as information reconciliation
and privacy amplification, side information V is exchanged
between Alice and Bob. V is generated with the aid of
corresponding encoders fA, fB implemented as Slepian-Wolf
decoders with side information. At the end of the SKG process,
a common key K ∈ K is extracted by Alice and Bob so that
for any ǫ > 0 the following statements are satisfied [4]:
Pr (K = fA (YA, V ) = fB (YB , V )) ≥ 1− ǫ, (1)
I(K;V ) ≤ ǫ, (2)
H(K) ≥ log |K| − ǫ. (3)
The first statement shows that the SKG process can be made
error free, in the asymptotic regime (for long length encoders
fA, fB). Inequality (2) ensures that the exchange of side
information through public discussion does not leak any in-
formation regarding K to eavesdroppers, while (3) establishes
maximum entropy (uniform distribution) of the generated keys.
Under these conditions, an upper bound on the SKG rate
is given by min [I(YA;YB), I(YA;YB |YE)] [1], [2]. In rich
multi-path environments, the decorrelation properties of the
wireless channel over short distances (of the order of a
wavelength) can be exploited to ensure that Eve’s observation
YE is uncorrelated from YA and YB [4]. In such cases, the
previous bound becomes tight and the maximum achievable
SKG rate, referred to as the SKG capacity, is simply given by
C = I(YA;YB) (4)
(see Section II in [1]). Here, we assume that the decorrelation
property of the observations holds.
SKG in Rayleigh fading channels has been analyzed ex-
tensively; in [4] in particular Alice and Bob were assumed
to exchange unit probe signals to excite a Rayleigh fading
channel and obtain observations YA and YB , respectively, as
follows
YA = H + ZA, (5)
YB = H + ZB , (6)
where H denoted the fading coefficient, modeled as a Gaussian
random variable H ∼ N (0, σ2H), and ZA and ZB de-
noted independent Gaussian noise variables with (ZA, ZB) ∼
N (0, diag (NA, NB)). Using this notation, the SKG capacity
was expressed as [4]
C = I(YA;YB) =
1
2
log2
(
1 +
σ2H
NA +NB +
NANB
σ2
H
)
. (7)
B. Jamming Attacks
In the following, we assume that Eve is an active adversary
that launches jamming attacks by transmitting constant jam-
ming signals to excite the Rayleigh fading medium in order to
impair the SKG process. The extended system model captures
the impact of jamming as follows:
YA =
√
pH +
√
γGA +WA, (8)
YB =
√
pH +
√
γGB +WB , (9)
where as previously YA and YB denote Alice’s and Bob’s
observations, respectively. The fading coefficient in the link
between Eve and Alice is denoted by GA ∼ N
(
0, σ2
)
and
in the link between Eve and Bob by GB ∼ N
(
0, σ2
)
.
For simplicity, the noise terms WA and WB are modeled
as independent and identically distributed Gaussian random
variables with zero mean and unit variance. Finally, in order
to incorporate the dimension of power control at the legitimate
users and the adversary, the legitimate transmit power is
denoted by p ≤ P and the jamming power by γ ≤ Γ.
Under these assumptions, a straightforward calculation re-
veals that the SKG capacity can be expressed as a function of
p and γ as:
C(p, γ) =
1
2
log2
❸
1 +
σ2Hp
2(1 + σ2γ) + (1+σ
2γ)2
σ2
H
p
➂
. (10)
We note that C(p, γ) is increasing in p for fixed γ and convex
decreasing in γ for fixed p. Thus, in absence of EH, the optimal
strategy (p∗, γ∗) for the legitimate nodes and the jammer is
to transmit at maximum power, i.e., p∗ = P and γ∗ = Γ.
C. Energy Harvesting to Counteract Jamming
Our aim is to investigate whether EH at the legitimate users
can improve the SKG capacity in the presence of jamming.
For this, we focus on a simple time-switching scheme [11]:
we assume that each transmission symbol of duration T is
divided in two parts. In the first part of duration τT (τ ∈ [0, 1]
being the proportion of the time dedicated to EH) both Alice
and Bob operate in EH mode with efficiency ζ ∈ (0, 1].
In the second part of duration (1 − τ)T , the legitimate
users operate in SKG mode using the overall available power
(including previously harvested power). Also, we assume that
the harvested energy can be stored in an energy storage unit
without any overflowing issues (unlimited storage) [13].
Under the above considerations, the energy harvested by
Alice and Bob can be expressed as
E = ζσ2γτT, (11)
so that the harvested power for each legitimate user per
communication cycle (to be used in the SKG mode) can be
expressed as
E
(1− τ)T = κγ, (12)
where κ(τ) , ζτσ
2
1−τ is a convex increasing function of τ .
Since the SKG process encompasses two cycles (from Alice
to Bob and from Bob to Alice), each legitimate user harvests
2κγ overall power before it actually transmits. Thus, the SKG
capacity can be expressed as
C(p, τ, γ) =
1− τ
2
log2
❸
1 +
(p+ 2κγ)σ2H
2(1 + σ2γ) + (1+σ
2γ)2
(p+2κγ)σ2
H
➂
.
(13)
Inspecting (13), we notice that our model generalizes the
SKG setting in II-B. To be specific, if the legitimate users
decide not to harvest energy (τ = 0), we obtain (10). In the
proposed system model, the legitimate users are able to exploit
an additional degree of freedom (i.e., τ ) to maximize the SKG
capacity. Moreover, by harvesting energy from the wireless
environment, the legitimate users can transform part of the
jamming power to useful transmission power. As a result,
the jammer may not wish to transmit always at its maximum
power.
III. TWO PLAYERS ZERO-SUM GAME
Non-cooperative game theory captures naturally the compet-
itive interaction between the legitimate users and the jammer.
Although the game theoretic framework has already been
exploited in physical layer security problems e.g., [14], to the
best of our knowledge, this work is the first to investigate EH
as an effective means to counteract jamming attacks.
We begin our analysis by discussing two important remarks
and their implications regarding the SKG capacity in (13).
Remark 1: For any fixed τ and γ, C(p, τ, γ) is monotonically
increasing in p and
arg max
p∈[0,P ]
C(p, τ, γ) = P. (14)
Remark 2: For any fixed p and τ , C(p, τ, γ) is monotone in
γ. In particular, it is monotonically decreasing in γ if p >
pth(τ) ,
2ζτ
1−τ , a constant if p = pth(τ), and monotonically
increasing if p < pth(τ). This implies that:
arg min
γ∈[0,Γ]
C (p, τ, γ) = 0, if p < pth(τ) (15)
arg min
γ∈[0,Γ]
C (p, τ, γ) ∈ [0,Γ], if p = pth(τ) (16)
arg min
γ∈[0,Γ]
C (p, τ, γ) = Γ, if p > pth(τ). (17)
Remark 1 shows that the legitimate users should transmit
at maximum power P to maximize the SKG utility. On the
contrary, Remark 2 shows that the jammer should practically
switch in between staying silent and jamming at full power Γ
depending on the choice (p, τ) of the legitimate users. This
implies that the legitimate users can neutralize the jammer by
choosing first (p, τ) such that p < pth(τ). Intuitively, equation
(15) illustrates that, if the legitimate users transmit at a power
level below the threshold pth(τ), the jammer’s optimal strategy
is to remain silent. Otherwise stated, the harm that the jammer
can cause in the SKG mode is overcome by the harvested
energy in the EH mode. If the legitimate users transmit at
exactly pth(τ), the jammer becomes indifferent between all
its choices γ ∈ [0,Γ] and has no interest in actively jamming
the transmission.
A. Jammer Neutralization
Given the above discussion and for the sake of simplicity
of the analysis, we assume that the choices of the jammer
are limited to its extremes γ ∈ {0,Γ} instead of [0,Γ] in the
remainder of this work. Denoting by p−1th (P ) ,
P
P+2ζ the
inverse function of pth(τ) defined in Remark 2, the necessary
conditions for the jammer neutralization are formalized in
Proposition 1.
Proposition 1: The optimal strategy for the legitimate
users that maximizes the SKG utility while ensuring that the
jammer has no interest in jamming the transmission is given
by:
pNJ = min{P, pth(τ̂)} and τNJ = min{p−1th (P ), τ̂}, (18)
where τ̂ ∈ (0, 1) is the unique maximizer of C(pth(τ), τ, 0)
w.r.t. τ .
For the detailed proof the reader is referred to Appendix A.
Whenever the legitimate user chooses (pNJ , τNJ), the
legitimate user transmits at the threshold identified in Remark
2. We can argue that the jammer is neutralized as it has no
interest in actively jamming the transmission. To formally
guarantee that the jammer stays silent the legitimate users
should harvest energy a fraction of time equal to τNJ and
transmit at power p = pNJ − εp < pNJ (strictly below the
threshold in Remark 2) for some εp > 0 which can be chosen
arbitrarily small (so that it has negligible impact on the SKG
capacity). Notice that if the jammer stays silent, i.e., γ = 0,
there is no actual energy that is harvested during the EH mode
of duration τNJ . Rather, the legitimate users’ choice to harvest
energy for a duration of τNJ acts as a threat to ensure that
the jammer has no interest in jamming the transmission. This
means that neutralizing the jammer may not be necessarily the
overall optimal strategy for the legitimate users. Another hint
for this is that whenever τNJ = τ̂ < p−1th (P ), the transmit
power is pNJ = pth(τ̂) < P , which we know from Remark 1
is not optimal.
B. Game Formulation and Nash Equilibrium
To formalize the interaction between the legitimate users
and the jammer, we define the following two-player zero-sum
game G = {AL,AJ , C (p, τ, γ)}. The players of the game are:
player L representing the legitimate users (that collaborate and
act as a single player) on one hand, and player J, the jammer,
on the other hand. Any of player’s L actions (p, τ) belong to
the set AL = [0, P ]× [0, 1] and player’s J actions γ belong to
the set AJ = {0,Γ}. The objective of player L is to maximize
the SKG capacity C(p, τ, γ) given in (13), whereas player J
aims at minimizing it.
The optimal strategy of one player depends on the choice
of its opponent and cannot be determined unilaterally. In such
interactive situations, the Nash equilibrium (NE) [15] is the
natural solution. Intuitively, a profile (pNE , τNE , γNE) is a
NE if none of the players can benefit by deviating from their
NE actions knowing that their opponents play according to the
NE. Hence, NEs are system states that are stable to unilateral
deviations. We can easily check that neutralizing the jammer
(pNJ , τNJ , 0) in Proposition 1 is not an NE. Knowing that the
jammer stays silent, player L can increase the game’s utility
by deviating to τ = 0 (reducing τ increases the utility if no
energy is harvested in the EH mode). This, in turn, will also
cause the jammer to deviate from γ = 0 to γ = Γ.
The NE of the game G turns out to be unique; at the NE
both players transmit with maximum power (similarly to the
case in which there is no EH capability). Also, depending on
the system parameters, the legitimate users may or may not use
their EH capability. The above are captured in the following
theorem.
Theorem 1: The game G has a unique NE given by
(P, τNE ,Γ). Depending on the system parameters, the EH
strategy is either τNE = 0 or τNE = min{p−1th (P ), τmax}
with p−1th (P ) =
P
P+2ζ and τmax ∈ (0, 1) representing the
critical maximum point of C(P, τ,Γ) w.r.t. τ .
The proof is detailed in Appendix B.
We observe that, at the NE and depending on the system
parameters, player L may either harvest energy at a rate
τNE < τNJ or not at all τNE = 0. Intuitively, at relatively
high transmit power P , the dominant term in the utility (13) is
the multiplicative term 1− τ outside of the logarithmic term.
Thus, when in NJ mode we may expect that the fraction of
time spent neutralizing the jammer is too costly given that no
energy is harvested and the NE provides a better utility to the
legitimate users in spite of full power jamming.
IV. NUMERICAL ILLUSTRATIONS AND DISCUSSION
In this Section, several representative illustrations are cho-
sen allowing the deduction of generic conclusions that carry
over most setups. The benchmark setting is chosen as follows:
unit jamming power Γ = 1, harvesting efficiency ζ = 0.7, unit
variance Rayleigh channel coefficients σ2 = σ2H = 1. The
legitimate users transmit with power P = ρG with ρ ∈ [0, 5].
We start by evaluating the SKG capacity at both the
NJ and NE states as a function of the system parameters.
In Fig. 1, the relative gain in utility obtained at the NE
(CNE = C(P, τNE ,Γ)) compared with the NJ (CNJ =
C(pNJ , τNJ , 0)), defined by E , C
NE−CNJ
CNE
is depicted as
a function of the signal to interference ratio (SIR) P/Γ for
Fig. 1. Relative utility gain at the NE vs. NJ E = (CNE − CNJ )/CNE
as a function of P/Γ ≥ 0 for ζ = 0.7.
different values of σ2 and σ2H . As expected the NJ strategy
never outperforms the NE in terms of utility. However, when
the SIR P/Γ is relatively small, both the NE and the NJ
provide identical utilities. In this case, the strategies of player
L are identical at both NE and NJ: pNJ = P and τNJ = τNE
and the jammer is indifferent between {0,Γ}. With increasing
SIR P/Γ, it is no longer optimal for the legitimate player
to harvest energy for a fraction of time τNJ in order to
neutralize the jammer. Instead, by limiting the duration of EH
to a fraction τNE < τNJ the SKG capacity increases in spite
of full power jamming γ = Γ. Finally, in the very high SIR
regime, i.e., for P/Γ ≫ 1, the legitimate users should not
harvest energy at all.
In Fig. 2, for the benchmark setting, two operating regions
are depicted w.r.t. P/Γ and the harvesting efficiency ζ. The
darker region represents the operating modes in which CNE =
CNJ , and the lighter region the operating modes for which
CNE > CNJ . For small ζ, the harvesting return is limited
and, as a result, a longer fraction of the symbol duration has
to be used to neutralize the jammer. This implies that, at the
NE, the legitimate users gain by decreasing the EH duration
τNE < τNJ for relatively lower values of the SIR P/Γ.
Subsequently, we evaluate the impact of the EH capability
on the SKG capacity. In Fig. 3, the relative gain in utility
obtained at the NE CNE = C(P, τNE ,Γ) compared with the
case in which there is no EH capability CNoEH = C(P, 0,Γ),
defined as F , C
NE−CNoEH
CNE
, is depicted as a function of
P/Γ. The benchmark setup is considered and the different
curves correspond to different harvesting efficiencies ζ ∈
[0.1, 0.9]. As expected, F increases with ζ. For P/Γ = 1,
ζ = 0.5 the gain is around 20 % while it increases to 30 %
for ζ = 0.7. At high SIR P/Γ, harvesting energy renders
only negligible relative gains, irrespective of the harvesting
efficiency.
Finally the relative utility F above is depicted in Fig. 4 for
ζ = 0.7 and various channel parameters. For low SIR P/Γ,
there is a significant gain in utility when employing EH. This
gain becomes significantly large at very low SIR, exceeding
Fig. 2. NE vs. NJ regions as functions of P/Γ ≥ 0 and 0 ≤ ζ ≤ 1 for
σ2 = σ2
H
= 1.
Fig. 3. Relative utility gain at the NE vs. no EH F = (CNE −
CnoEH)/CNE as a function of P/Γ ≥ 0.
97.5 % in certain cases, while for similar settings it is in the
range of 60 % in the medium SIR range.
In conclusion, EH enables the legitimate users to combat
the jammer’s attacks more efficiently especially at relatively
low SIR. This capability allows either to completely neutralize
the jammer when τNE = τNJ or to simply turn part of the
jamming power to useful communication power.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this work, energy harvesting at the legitimate users was
investigated as a possible way to counteract malicious jam-
ming in wireless SKG systems. A zero-sum game framework
was introduced to analyze the adversarial interaction between
a jammer and a pair of legitimate nodes; the game’s unique
NE was characterized in closed-form. The EH capability was
shown to offer to the legitimate users the opportunity to
effectively neutralize the jammer. However, this option does
Fig. 4. Relative utility gain at the NE vs. no EH F = (CNE −
CnoEH)/CNE as a function of P/Γ ≥ 0 for ζ = 0.7.
not necessarily correspond to the optimal strategy because
when the jammer remains silent no actual energy can be
harvested and the EH capability simply acts as a threat against
jamming. Hence, at the NE, the legitimate users do not
necessarily neutralize the jammer; in many cases the jamming
power should instead be harvested in order to be used in the
actual transmission. Numerical simulations show that the EH
capability can greatly improve the relative utility compared
to a system without EH, especially in the low SIR regime in
which the relative gain can be particularly high.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
Proof: Assume that the legitimate users neutralize the
jammer by transmitting at power p ∈ [0,min pth(τ), P ]. The
jammer observes the legitimate user’s choice and decides to
stay silent. Notice that the legitimate user can force the jammer
to remain silent by transmitting at p ∈ [0,min{pth(τ)−εp, P}]
for an arbitrarily small εp > 0 (with little impact on the SKG
utility). However, for simplicity, we will ignore this detail here.
The remaining question is: how will the legitimate user
choose τ ∈ [0, 1) and p ∈ [0,min{pth(τ), P}] to maximize
the resulting SKG utility
C(p, τ, 0) =
1− τ
2
log2
(
1 +
pσ2H
2 + 1
pσ2
H
)
, (19)
(while ensuring that the jammer stays silent). Since the feasible
set of p depends on τ , we first have to find the maximum
of C(p, τ, 0) w.r.t. p for any fixed τ . The function C(p, τ, 0)
is strictly increasing in p and, hence, the optimal power is
given by p̂(τ) = min{P, pth(τ)}. Now, we need to maximize
C(p̂(τ), τ, 0) w.r.t. τ ∈ [0, 1]:
C(pth(τ), τ, 0) =
1− τ
2
log2
(
1 +
2ζσ2Hτ
(2 + 1−τ
2ζσ2
H
τ
)(1− τ)
)
.
At the extremes τ = 0 and τ → 1 the utility goes to zero.
By investigating its second order derivatives w.r.t. τ , which
amounts to the following quadratic equation:
(1− τ)2 − 8σ4Hζ2τ2 = 0, (20)
it can be shown that C(pth(τ), τ, 0) always has an inflexion
point in between (0, 1) and starts as convex and then becomes
concave. Knowing that the the utility is always positive, we can
conclude that C(pth(τ), τ, 0) has a unique critical point that
is the global maximizer τ̂ ∈ (0, 1) and which is the solution
to
dC(pth(τ),τ,0)
dτ
= 0. This implies that, if pth(τ̂) ≤ P , then
the optimal solution that neutralizes the jammer is τNJ = τ̂
and pNJ = pth(τ̂). If pth(τ̂) > P , then the optimal solution
that neutralizes the jammer is pNJ = P and τNJ = p−1th (P ).
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Proof: From Remark 1, we know that transmitting at
maximum power is a strictly dominant strategy for player L
and, hence, pNE = P .
We start by proving that, at the NE, player L will not spend
time harvesting energy longer than the threshold p−1th (P ). Let’s
suppose by absurdum that τNE > p−1th (P ), then the jammer’s
best response would be to remain silent γNE = 0. Then,
the optimal τNE maximizing the utility C(P, τ, 0) (which
is decreasing in τ ) would be τNE → p−1th (P ) obtaining the
utility CNE → C(P, p−1th (P ), 0). However, this state cannot
be an NE. Indeed, if the jammer stays silent γNE = 0, no
energy is harvested during τNE and player L gains in utility
by deviating to τ = 0. This will also cause the jammer to
deviate to γ = Γ.
The above implies that player L will choose an EH strategy
such that τNE ≤ p−1th (P ) at the NE. This condition is
equivalent to P ≥ pth(τNE), which means that the utility
is either decreasing or simply a constant in γ (see Remark 2).
If the jammer uses maximum power γNE = Γ, then it
does not gain by deviating. Thus, we only need to find the
optimal value of τ ∈ [0, p−1th (P )] that maximizes the function
C(P, τ,Γ) given by:
C(P, τ,Γ) =
1− τ
2
log2
❸
1 +
(P + 2κ(τ)Γ)σ2H
2(1 + σ2Γ) + (1+σ
2Γ)2
(P+2κ(τ)Γ)σ2
H
➂
where κ(τ) = ζτσ
2
1−τ . At τ = 0, this function is strictly positive
C(P, 0,Γ) > 0 equal to the SKG capacity without EH and,
when τ → 1 the function goes to 0. By investigating the
second order derivative of C(P, τ,Γ) w.r.t. τ , which amounts
to the analysis of the following quadratic equation
(1− τ)2(1 + σ2Γ)2 − 2σ4H(P (1− τ) + 2σ2ζΓτ)2 = 0, (21)
two different cases arise:
- Case A: If 1 + σ2Γ ≥
√
2σ2HP , C(P, τ,Γ) has a unique
inflexion point that lies in (0, 1) and the function starts as
convex and then becomes concave. Thus, C(P, τ,Γ) has a
critical point that is a local maximum τmax ∈ (0, 1), which is
a solution of the equation
dC(P,τ,Γ)
dτ
= 0. Hence, the optimal
strategy is either τmax or one of the borders of [0, p
−1
th (P )],
depending on the system parameters:
τNE = arg max
τ∈{0,min{p−1
th
(P ),τmax}}
C(P, τ,Γ). (22)
- Case B: If 1 + σ2Γ <
√
2σ2HP , then the function is
always concave (and it does not have an inflexion point)
in (0, 1). If the function has a critical point in (0, 1), then
this critical point is a maximum point denoted by τmax
and τNE = min{p−1th (P ), τmax}. Otherwise, the function is
concave decreasing and τNE = 0.
Since the state (P, p−1th (P ), 0) is not a NE, the game’s
unique NE is given by (P, τNE ,Γ) where τNE depends on the
system parameters and equals zero or min{p−1th (P ), τmax}.
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